

THOUGHT'S SOCIAL NATURE

Not just agreement in definition, but also (strange as it may sound) agreement in judgements, is part of what an understanding is. (*Philosophical Investigations* §242)

It is not hard, and not *always* wrong, to see Frege and later Wittgenstein as opponents. But it is often more productive to see Frege as bequeathing deep, and seminal, insights which Wittgenstein then adopts, unfolds, and brings to full fruition. This essay concerns a case in point. Frege's insights, in this case, are, first and foremost, two ideas about thoughts: one about a thought's essentially social character; one about a sort of generality which is intrinsic a thought. Wittgenstein's main idea here is contained in the motto above. It is thus the main moral of the rule-following discussion of the *Investigations*. It is an idea he is already working towards in the *Blue Book* when he says,

What one wishes to say is: "Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the *meaning* mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation." (*BB* 34)

It is an idea of how to conceive our meaning our words as we thus must. It is an idea Wittgenstein also is working towards in the *Investigations* from about §§429-464, e.g., in this passage:

We say: "The order orders *this* —" and do it; but we also say: "The order orders this: I am to ...". Sometimes we translate the order into a proposition, other times into a demonstration, other times into action. (§459)

It is an idea of what it is for such a translation to be correct; a response to something which *may* make the idea of correctness here seem problematic. The idea is also in view in that area of the *Investigations* in which Wittgenstein tells us,

"But how can a rule show me what I have to do in *this* case? Whatever I do is reconcilable with the rule on some interpretation."—No, we should not so put it. But rather: Every interpretation hangs in the air, together with what it interprets; it cannot serve as support. (§198)

What this shows it that there is an understanding of a rule which is not an

interpretation. (§201)

So cast, it is an idea of what an understanding which is not an interpretation might be.

1. The Social: In “Der Gedanke” Frege raises the question whether a thought could be an ‘idea’ (‘Vorstellung’). (1918: 66) He answers in the negative. The core of the idea that thoughts are intrinsically social lies in that answer. The words ‘idea’ and ‘Vorstellung’ both have a (related) notorious philosophical past. But Frege is careful to say what *he* means by ‘Vorstellung’. The key features are: for any *Vorstellung*, there is someone you *must* be to be aware of it (every *Vorstellung* needs a bearer); a *Vorstellung* is coeval with that awareness of it. A *Vorstellung* need not be an object of *sensory* awareness. That does not belong to the question Frege means to raise in asking whether a thought might be one. Nor is to deny that a thought is a *Vorstellung* to deny that a thought represents things as a certain way. Quite the opposite: a thought represents *things* to be a certain way—things, in that catholic sense, in which one cannot ask which ones. Given his negative answer to his question, *things* in this sense, speaks of our cohabited environment. Thoughts are *not* as to the ways of *Vorstellungen*.

If we understand ‘Vorstellung’ in this sense, then a negative answer to Frege’s question means, first, that, for any thought, there is no one one needs to be to get it in mind (to grasp it), nor need one be on any fixed list of thinkers; and, second, that for there to be the thought that such-and-such, it is not required that someone either think, or grasp, it. So—the key point here—it is intrinsic to a thought to be shareable: anything *I* can think is something other thinkers can also think, or, again, doubt, deny, dispute, investigate, bring considerations to bear for or against.

Frege’s argument for his negative answer is, in effect, an argument against the possibility of private language. It is a neat argument, which I will not try to spell out here. (Though I have tried elsewhere—see my 2005.) But I will give a brief synopsis of the strategy. The argument proceeds in two stages. At the first stage, Frege argues that if a predicate— ‘is red’ (or rather ‘ist rot’) is his example—were to be applicable to a *Vorstellung* (in the example, one which *is* meant to be an object of sensory awareness), it would need, for this, a different sense than it would have in application to some item in our shared environment (that is, as he also argues, a sense different from the sort of sense we usually take ‘is red’ to bear). The reason for this, in brief, is that it is part of what it is for something to be red, in the usual sense of that word, for it to participate in networks of factive meaning: other aspects of the environment bear on whether a given item is red, as its being red bears on other aspects of the environment. E.g. (again Frege’s example), it matters to whether a strawberry is red what will happen when you compare it with (hold it next to) a standard sample of the colour red. Whereas *Vorstellungen* are not the sorts of things which could have a place in (such) a network of factive meaning. In the second stage of the argument, Frege notes that if a thought were a *Vorstellung*, then, by the conclusion of the first stage, ‘is true’, as applied to it, would have to have a different sense from that which we usually take that predicate to have—one on which it would apply to, and only to, *Vorstellungen*. Here is a very brief statement of the problem with that. A thought was meant to be *precisely* the sort of thing which is liable to be true or false, according to how things are. Bringing *truth*-evaluable (bringing truth into question)

is the central mark of a thought. Our question was whether a *thought* could be a *Vorstellung*; to respond by pointing to *Vorstellungen* which can be true only in some new sense of 'true' is just to change the subject. (Again, this is meant only as the outline of an argument.)

So far, the point is just that thought are shareable, in this minimal sense: whatever *I* think so—whatever there *is* for *one* to think so—is what indefinitely many others might think; and in a stronger one: whatever *I* think so is what indefinitely many others might dispute, or dissent from—what might be debated. This is not to rule out nonlinguistic thinkers, though the stronger sense insists on linguistic ones—such as ourselves. Frege then points to a presupposition of shareability in either sense:

I might have my science, namely the totality of thoughts whose bearer I am, another his science. Each of us would occupy himself with the contents of his consciousness. A contradiction between both bodies of knowledge is then not possible; and it is really silly to dispute about truth, as silly, in fact nearly ridiculous, as it would be if two people disputed whether a hundred mark note was genuine, where each meant the one he had in his own pocket, and understood the word 'genuine' in his own special sense. If someone held thoughts to be ideas, what he thereby recognised as true would, on his own account, belong to the contents of his consciousness and would not concern anyone else at all. And if he heard the opinion from me that thoughts were not ideas, he could not dispute it; for it would surely not concern him at all. (1918: 69)

One cannot disagree, or dispute, with someone as to whether such-and-such unless there is enough else which both parties agree to. If I call copper tresses red and you do not, then if I would call Pia's hair red and you would not, we are not yet expressing disagreement as to how Pia's hair is coloured; no disagreement settled by its being coloured as it is. (Not implausibly, we may disagree as to how Pia's hair is where I would call it red, you not, only if we would agree, of the way Pia's hair is in fact coloured, as to whether *that* is being coloured red. This leaves room for honest disagreement: one (or both) of us may be ignorant of something significant as to how Pia's hair is in fact coloured.) We *may* disagree as to what is to be called *red*. But it is *red* that we thus disagree about only if we both have being *red* in mind, so only if we agree on enough as to when something *would* be that. We disagree on what colour copper tresses are to be called only in agreeing, e.g., on whether ripe tomatoes, or certain sunsets, or fresh pools of blood, or whatever, are (of) the colour thus in question. We both have some one way for hair to be in mind only if we agree on *enough*, not necessarily everything, as to when hair would be that way. We can both have *red* in mind while disagreeing on copper tresses. We both have *red* in mind only if we both agree to enough (again, not necessarily all) of what there *is* to agree to as to what being *red* is (so what would count as a case of it).

Thought's social nature means: *I* think things to be some given way only where some extendible range of thinkers would agree (and agree with me) sufficiently as to what would count

as things *being* that way; only where, so to speak, there is a (potential) community of agreement (or of agreeers). But now, this idea, however Fregean, must be squared with the second half of Frege's denial that a thought could be a *Vorstellung*. Frege states that second half in these words:

Thus, for example, the thought which we express in the Pythagorean theorem is timelessly true, true independent of whether anyone holds it true. It needs no bearer. Like a planet, which has been interacting with other planets before anyone has seen it, it is not true only after it has been discovered. (1918: 69)

Fix a way for things to be—say, such that the sum of the squares of the sides equals the square of the hypotenuse, or such that the rug is white. Now whether things are *that way depends* in no way on what thinkers would agree to: not on what we, or any thinkers, would *count* as what; not on how we *stand* towards the sides of triangles relating as they do, or towards the rug's being coloured as it is. Such is built into Frege's conception of the objectivity (or, equivalently, truth-evaluability) of judgement; the idea that a judgement is correct or incorrect *solely* by virtue of things being as they are, and *not* by virtue of anyone's attitude towards the bearing of that on the correctness of the judgement. It bears stressing that nothing to follow—so nothing in Wittgenstein—disputes, or is in conflict with, that idea.

But, Wittgenstein notes, there is a reverse side to Frege's coin. By Frege's side of the coin, for any way for things to be, there is that which is to be recognised (that which is so) as to what it would be for things to be that way—what would count, what not, as a case of that. Suppose, now, that there is a community of thinkers who, jointly, have a given way for things to be in mind—who can, perhaps sometimes do, think, and speak, in terms of things being that way or not. So, by Frege's point about the importance of agreement, there is that to which they would agree (or are prepared to) as to what would count, and what not, as things being the way in question. Then, the idea is, to identify what way it is that they have in mind, look for a way for things to be such that there is (sufficiently nearly) just that to be recognised as to when things would count, when not, as things being that way. Bracketing complications where there are several such ways, if you find such a way, you will have found, or identified, what it is they have in mind. What *they* would agree would be a case of being some way *they* have in mind—what they call being such-and-such—is, in fact, say, what *would* count as a case of something being red. Again bracketing those complications, such just is their having being red in mind. The community in question might be us. So, by the reverse side of the coin, where there is a question as to which way for things to be *we* speak of in speaking of things being such-and-such, one can find an answer to that question in looking to what we would agree to as to what is to be called 'being such-and-such'.

Without care in stating, and applying, this reverse side of Frege's coin, it *can* look as if it is in conflict with Frege's side. Hence Wittgenstein's persistent concern to insist that it is not. He says, e.g.,

You say, ‘*That* is red.’ but how is it decided if you are right? Doesn’t human agreement decide? (Zettel, §429)

Colour words are explained like this: ‘That’s red’ e.g.—Our language game only works, of course, when a certain agreement prevails. but the concept of agreement does not enter into the language game. (Zettel, §430)

Does human agreement *decide* what is red? Is it decided by appeal to the majority? Were we taught to determine colour in *that* way? (Zettel, §431)

Frege’s coin *has* two sides. If there is a problem, it is to reconcile them.

3. The Conceptual: Frege remarked,

A thought always contains something which reaches beyond the particular case, by means of which this is presented to consciousness as falling under something general. (1882: *Kernsatz* 4)

A thought represents the particular case as a certain way. For it to do that is for it to reach to a range of cases: just those in which things being as they were would be their being that way. For there to be a range is just for not everything to matter to things being as the thought represents them. If the thought is true, then things being as they are *is* things being that way. This is *one* way for things so to be. But there are always an indefinitely extendible variety of others. If the thought is that red meat is on the white rug, the meat might be venison or mutton, Angus or Charolais, the rug shag or broadloom; Pia might be sleeping or surfing, or might not have been. And so on *ad inf.* But it could not be tofu on the rug, or plastic ‘meat’. So this thought reaches to an indefinitely large range of cases. Equally for things *not* being as it represents them—the cases it does not reach. The generality intrinsic to a thought demands, for *any* thought, one such range.

A thought which reached to just *one* case would reach only things being as they are. *Everything* in things so being would matter to being *thus* reached. Or else more would be reached. It could not reach some *other* case. What *else* but things being as they are would be found in precisely *one* case? So a thought which reached to precisely one case would be that things are that way which to be which they would have to be just as they are. It would not be some very long conjunction, each conjunct reaching to many cases, the whole narrowing these down to one. There are no such conjunctions. To grasp how things would be in being this way, one would need to grasp no less than *all* of how things were. Thoughts are guides to the conduct of a life. A given one has specific bearing on what to think and do. A thought true of just *this* case—things being as they (in fact) are—would have all the bearing one could wish—if one could but grasp it. But, for a

finite thinker, there could be no such thing as seeing the bearing *this* thought would have; nor as the bearing one would see in grasping it. So no such thing as (as Frege puts it) the way one exposes oneself to error in so judging. Which makes this not really a thought at all.

The particular case is what the thought represents as a certain way. What it so represents is: things being as they are. *Another* case for the thought to reach would be things being, somehow, other than they are. We cannot specify just *one* such case. That is the generality of a thought. This generality shows up elsewhere. One can decompose a thought, in one way or another, into elements—some set of partial contributions which jointly add up, in one way or another, to what the whole thought does. When we do this, Frege tells us, no matter how, we always find at least one element with the same sort of generality a thought has. If the thought is that the meat is turning brown, one element one might find—on *some* decomposition—is: (being about) something turning brown. There are a multitude of ways for something's being as it is to be it turning brown, and for something's being as it is *not* to be this. All the above applies. Here different cases of something turning brown might be found in different *things* being as they are. Further cases need not merely be what might have been. Finally, if the thought is *that* the meat is turning brown, then the meat's turning brown is a way for *things* to be just as (something) turning brown is a way for *a* thing to be. A way for things, or for a thing, to be again shares a thought's generality.

The particular case—what a thought represents as thus and so—precisely lacks a thought's intrinsic generality. A thought is tied to the ambitions of a certain posture; the way things are is not. The thought's reach lies in those ambitions. Nothing gives the way things are a reach at all. There are no *two* cases of things being as they are. Things might have been just the same *on some understanding* of *same*, while then not the same on others. Things being as they are confers no understanding on *same*.

I will call what has a thought's intrinsic generality *conceptual*, the domain of such things (if we permit ourselves the conceit) *the conceptual*; what lacks that generality *nonconceptual*, or, again, *the nonconceptual*. A bit of the conceptual—things, or something, being such-and-such way, or what presents (or makes a thought about) this—reaches to just those particular cases which are (or would be) ones in which things (or something's) being as they are (or were) would be things (or that thing) being *that* way. I will also speak of what some bit of the conceptual reaches to as *instancing* it.

This first idea of Frege's fits together with another. He writes,

The fundamental logical relation is that of an object falling under a concept:
all relations between concepts reduce to this. (1892-1895: 25)

Objects, for Frege, are what *are* thus and so, not what instances *being* thus and so. Concepts, in his sense, are not ways of presenting something; not elements in a thought's way of doing it which make it *about* some way for something to be. Nor are they a *way* for things to be. Nor are they, I think, any more than *contingently* of being such-and-such (in whatever sense they might be this at

all.) Concepts (his sense) are what some parts of an *expression* of a thought *refer* to. I will say no more here about what *this* is. In any case, the relation between an object and a concept is not the same as that between a particular case—the nonconceptual—and some bit of the conceptual. *Falling under* is not *instancing*.

There are, for all that, parallels. A Fregean concept is the sort of thing under which an object falls. An object is not. The distinction between objects and concepts is, for Frege, absolute and fundamental. The same thing cannot be, sometimes an object, sometimes a concept. A Fregean concept thus connects with a range of cases: those objects which fall under it; and another range, those objects which do not. An object falls under concepts. It is an object's being as it is that *instances* ways for things to be. Still, what instances here is not what is itself instanced. It is fundamentally different from that. Nor can something sometimes belong to the nonconceptual, sometimes to the conceptual. Relations between concepts, Frege tells us, reduce to one between concepts and objects: falling under. I will not speak of reduction. But I can say: relations within the conceptual cannot really be brought in view at all, are not the ones they are, and do not give the conceptual any reach at all, independent of the fundamental relation between the conceptual and the nonconceptual: *instancing* (or its converse, *reaching*). The conceptual-nonconceptual distinction is the key to understanding those initial *Blue Book* passages.

3. Instancing: I turn now to Wittgenstein's unfolding of those Fregean ideas just scouted. I begin by getting the main idea here on the table. In terms of the second, we can now say: a bit of the conceptual participates in two sorts of relations. There are relations entirely within the conceptual, between some of its bits and others. Something being red participates in some of these in bearing as it does on something being green. Then there are relations in which the conceptual reaches outside of itself to participate in relations with (bits of) the nonconceptual. Instancing is the central case. Now the main idea can be put this way: the internal shape of the conceptual—that structure imposed on it simply by those relations within it—cannot, purely on its own, impose *any* shape on relations between the conceptual and what lies outside it; notably, cannot give any bit of the conceptual any particular reach to the nonconceptual.

What makes being red reach where, or as, it does? One might see this in its position in a system of ways to be coloured. E.g. (say), where being green reaches, being red does not. This *may* help us see where being red reaches—insofar as, but only insofar as, we see where being green reaches. But without the reaches of other ways to be coloured already fixed, a place within a system of them fixes nothing as to reach.

Often, in particular circumstances, for particular purposes, we can, and *do*, say how some less familiar bit of the conceptual reaches by connecting it to more familiar bits. It sometimes helps to identify the reach of *being a chair* to point out that a chair is a seat for one. Or if you want to see how my present notion of *notion* reaches, you must look to what I have said in introducing it, which consists almost entirely of linking it to other bits of the conceptual. But suppose what we wanted was an explanation of the instancing relation's being, as a whole, as it is rather than otherwise—an answer to the question what *makes* it as a whole relate to one another just the things as it does, just as it does, rather than relating these things in some other way. Or, to ask the

question differently, suppose we wanted an answer to the question what makes the conceptual as a whole reach as it does (or, for that matter, reach at all), rather than in some other way. Then the point is: there *is* no answer to such questions. Nothing *makes* the conceptual as a whole reach as it does. Nothing, for that matter, makes *being red* reach as it does. Reaching as *being red* does is just part of what it is for a way for a thing to be to be *that* one; is intrinsic to what *being red* is, to which way for a thing to be it is. It is a misunderstanding to think that something else *makes* being red reach as it does, or, in the *Blue Book's* terms, justifies its so reaching. This is the main point here.

Now let us return to that *Blue Book* idea: signs may admit of interpretation; but someone's meaning must not. There is a simple point of grammar here. If I say, 'The sails were red', you may ask whether those words are to be understood in a way such as to be true if the sails' red look was just the work of a sunset, or such as then to be untrue. Either answer might be right, depending on the circumstances in which I spoke. The words I used, as such, might be interpreted in either way. In that sense, *they* admit of interpretation. I, too, might be interpreted in either way, though rightly or wrongly depending on how I meant them (or was to be taken to have). I may have *meant* my words so as to be true of sails red only in the sunset, or so as not to be. Or I may have meant them such as for them to be true, or false, of such sails only on an interpretation, thus not in a way on which they would be true or false (outright, pleonastically) at all. But it cannot be that I meant them in one such way only on a certain interpretation of my meaning (which, if this means anything, would be for me *not* to have meant them in that way); nor that I meant them in a certain way only if a certain interpretation of my meaning is correct. For an interpretation of my meaning to be correct, if this meant anything, would just be for that to be the way I meant it; which would be for my meaning to call for interpretation.

The application of this grammatical point in the context of our present main point is just this. For me to have meant (to say) that the sails were *red* (forget for the moment any fine points as to what would count as their being red), I must have had, at the time I spoke, their being *red* in mind. But, reflecting on the main point, it can seem problematic that I, or anyone, could do such a thing as having being red in mind. Similarly for any other way for a thing to be in terms of which we (think we) think. For, for it to be *being red* that I had in mind, what I had in mind would have to reach—participate in the instancing relation—(nearly enough) as *being red* does reach. (The reverse side of Frege's coin.) And this can now seem impossible. To see why, I will make a comparison.

A man in Ulan Bator is now standing before his yurt, sipping tea. (Make it 10 his time.) I cannot think a thought, of *him*, that he is doing that—a thought which presents *him* as the one who must be some way for the thought to be true, and sipping tea before his yurt at 10 as what he must be doing. I cannot do this, since I neither know, nor know of, anyone in Ulan Bator (though I am sure some people live there). I can, to be sure, think that everyone in Ulan Bator stands before his yurt at 10 and sips tea. What I thus think will be false if this man does not do that. The thought I thus think has a certain kind of generality which allows it to be true, or false, in this way. But as Frege points out (1914: 108-109, different example), that man falsifies my statement only given that he is in Ulan Bator—in present terms, only given that his being as he is participates in the instancing relation with that way for a thing to be. And it is just this last that I

am not in a position to think—a corollary of not being able to think of him at all. Thinking a thought which is false given his being as he is is not the same thing as thinking a thought of *him*.

Now consider those sails, or rather, that particular bit of history which is their being as they will be tomorrow (at 10). This is something which may well either bear the instancing relation to *something being red*, or fail to (but rather bear it to something *not* being red). Which is to say that *something being red* is the sort of thing which has such reach: if it does not participate in the instancing relation with the particular item just mentioned, it will with others of that sort—say, those currently white sheets being as they will be after coming out of the wash tomorrow. So to have *being red* in mind, I must have in mind something with that sort of reach. But items of this sort—things being *just* that which they will be—are items I cannot yet get in mind at all. I can as little, now, think thoughts *of them* that they are thus and so as I can think thoughts of that man before his yurt. In particular, I cannot think thoughts *of them* that they bear the instancing relation to some way for things to be—say, to *being red*. I can, of course, think that those sails will be a way tomorrow which will be (*inter alia*) their being red. (Just that, in fact, is the problem.) But I cannot now think of just that which they will, in fact, be tomorrow in being as they then will be that *that* is a case of something being red. There is as yet no such thing to think about. So the problem is: How can I have in mind a way for things to be which reaches to something when the thought that it reaches to *that* is not one that I can as yet so much as entertain?

This is the problem Wittgenstein points to in *Investigations* §459. You give the order. I translate it into action. That is, I do what I then do. But that very thing which I then do—that particular episode in world history—is not something you could have had in mind, had thoughts about, at all at the time you gave the order. So, whatever I do, how can *that* be either what you meant me to do, or not what you meant me to do—carrying out the order as you meant it, or not?

It can be tempting to try to answer this question by looking for something else I could have in mind which would require that just those cases of something bearing the instancing relation to *being red* which I cannot yet get in mind be ones of bearing the instancing relation to what I do now have in mind. Frege (1904) considers, and rejects for the role of *function*, the sort of thing which might seem to do the trick. It is what he there calls a *Gesetz der Zuordnung*, a *law*, specifically, a law of association: something which spells out, somehow, what is required, *in general*, for something to be a case of what I have in mind. But a law belongs to the conceptual. It is thus clearly useless for the present purpose. It only postpones the worry. For how do I get in mind a *law* which dictates just that reach for what I have in mind which goes with *being red*? This is no easier a question than the one with which we started. So if we approach the apparent problem in this way, we are only spinning gears, engaged with nothing. There is no solution along such lines.

We can get traction in applying Frege's idea of thought as social. Here I will only sketch the main ingredients. I start with thinking. First, where there is something I think so, I belong to a range of thinkers who might think just *that* so, or not so. These thinkers form a community of agreement as to what would count, what not, as this being so. 'Community' here does not refer to some social, or geographical, entity. Membership is gained simply in ability to think the thing in question (e.g., that meat is on the rug); hence in (sufficient) agreement as to what would count as

a case, and as not a case, of that thing (e.g., of meat being on the rug).

Second, agreement here will be extendible in the same sense as the community is: For any range of cases on which the community as a whole would agree—cases of the holding of the instancing relation between something nonconceptual and the way for things to be in question—there may be further (novel) cases on which they would agree. The community, that is, will, recognisably, share a sense for what to count as a case of this way for things to be—a sense which (to count as a *sense* for something at all) reaches to novel cases. Agreement then consists, not in unmitigated, or majority, consent, but in there being such a thing as that which someone with the sense in question *would* find (such a thing as what the sense in question dictates).

To make the third point, I appeal to a distinction between two notions of *recognise*: recognition as acknowledgement, and recognition as pure cognitive achievement (of one of several sorts). That distinction is marked, nearly enough, in German and Dutch by different verbs—in German by *anerkennen* and *erkennen* respectively. Thus, for Frege, to see that the sun has set is to *erkennen* the truth of a thought; to *judge* that the sun has set is to *anerkennen* the truth of a thought (1918: 61-62). (Here, already, the needed point. To *erkennen*—see—that the sun has set is to *judge*—so *anerkennen*—that it has. Conversely, one's *Anerkennung*—judging—that the sun has set, e.g., as one sees it sink over the horizon, may well be *Erkennung*—seeing that the sun has set. Similarly, where I think something—say, that the sun has set—for the relevant community to share its sense of *Anerkennung*—of what to count as a case of things being that way which I thus thought them—may be for it to enjoy a capacity for *Erkennung*—a capacity to tell what *is* (*does* count as) a case of things being that way.

Where there is a community of agreement, there is anyway *some* distinction to be drawn between two sorts of particular case: cases that this community would *count* as a case of being such-and-such way; and cases which it would count as *not* that. This is a familiar point. Now the idea is: if this community is the community of those thinkers with just *that* way for things to be in mind, then what they would *count* as a particular case of things being that way just *is*

Now the conclusion: since I belong to that community, am thinking just that which is the object of that capacity for *Erkennung*, and since, by definition, a capacity extends to novel cases, I thus have in mind a way for things to be—am thinking things to be a way—which is instanced by, and *not* instanced by, particular cases of which I cannot yet think. My membership in the community permits me thoughts which reach to cases of which I cannot think.

But all this is in the form of a conditional. Which may lead to an objection, as follows. Granted, *if* I am thinking something so, then the above three conditions are met, so that, indeed, I have in mind what reaches to cases of which I cannot think. But that I have such a thing in mind *if* I am thinking something so we knew already. Could these conditions not *seem* to be met where they are not? Could I not seem (*inter alia*, to myself) to be thinking something so, where there is no such thing for *one* to think? (What about witches, e.g.? I *think* being a witch is a way for someone to be; but there is no such way to be at all.) If there could merely seem to be something to think where there is not, then (what seems) our original problem just returns in a new form: What would it be for something to be a case where the above conditions were actually met, as opposed, notably, to its being a case where they (at best) merely seemed to be?

This worry will not be answered here in the detail it deserves. I confine myself to two remarks. First, we can (let us suppose) find an understanding of being a witch on which there is really no such thing as that. (Let us call this the 16th century understanding.) Holding such an understanding, I might ‘think that Pia is a witch’, but could not be thinking that Pia is a witch: since there is no such way for things to be, I could not be thinking things to be that way. Were I living in the 16th century, I would be surrounded by others who thought there was such a way, and that they could distinguish between those particular cases (those bits of the nonconceptual) which did instance someone being a witch (count as a case of that) and those which did not. Do they form a community—in the present sense of ‘community’—which, through their shared sense of what to acknowledge as a case, were at least drawing *some* distinction—one between cases which they would *count* as ones of someone being a witch, and ones which they would not? Probably not. Not, e.g., if, from case to case, they were just moved by some contagious hysteria (or someone with a way with words). If things were like that, there would be no fact as to how the distinction they might *seem* to be drawing would extend to novel cases. Which would make it no distinction at all. (On the other hand, if they really were drawing some distinction, it might be, as one biochemist once suggested, one between women with, and those without, such-and-such a hormonal imbalance; which points to one perfectly good thing being a witch *might* be.)

Which points to a more important point. If I have the 16th century understanding of being a witch, and do what I call ‘thinking Pia to be a witch’, I do not thereby think anything to the effect that Pia is a witch: there is nothing to think which would be thinking *that*. But there are some relevant things I still do think, notably that there is such a thing as someone being a witch, and that Pia’s being as she is instances (is a case of) someone being this way. If I do think that, it follows that I belong to a community of thinkers who can think thoughts about there being such a thing as someone being a witch (on the 16th century understanding), and thus who can have in mind a certain way for someone to be, namely, such as to think that someone is a witch (on that understanding); and a certain way for things to be, namely, that there is such a thing as someone being a witch (16th century understanding). This community—to which I belong—will share a sense for what to count as a case of there being such a way for someone to be, and there being such a way for things to be; a sense which (to wax pleonastic) extends to novel cases. *We* share such a sense, and are thus able to recognise, of *any* case of someone’s being as he is that *that* does not count as a case of someone being a witch (16th century understanding); so, too, of any case of someone being as he is that *that* does not count as a case of someone thinking someone to be a witch. Which is to say: insofar as there is such a thing as someone merely seeming to think things to be some particular way, where there is really no such way to think things, we can also recognise such a case for what it is (given, of course, sufficient access to how things in fact are). Naturally, insofar as there is such a thing, we may make mistakes—if not as to what would *count* as a case of such *schein*-thinking, then, anyway, as to whether such-and-such *is* such a case.

This introduces my second, and more important, remark. There is one more element in Wittgenstein’s way with the problem which concerns him so much: how one can have in mind what reaches to what one cannot (then) think of. It is, perhaps, the most crucial element of all. The objection just raised starts from the premise (granted here) that there is such a thing as there seeming to be a way for things to be, and hence a thought for one to have, where there is not. So,

it adds, there is such a thing as those three above-stated conditions seeming to be satisfied when they are not. This is also granted here. It then asks for something which would distinguish genuine from spurious ways for things to be, or genuine from spurious satisfaction of those three conditions; some answer to the question what it would *be* for a case to be genuine rather than spurious, where this would state something else there would be anyway where a case was genuine, some mark of the genuine, something (non-question-begging) which would *show* something to be a genuine way for things to be, or a genuine case of a shared sense of agreement, or etc. No such answer is in the offing, either here, or in Wittgenstein. This is for principled reasons, which begin (but only begin) with a way of finessing the question.

The suggestion is that we turn our problem around. The objector supposes that there are two kinds of case: cases of genuine ways for (say) something to be—on a rug, say; and cases of *schein*-ways for something to be—a witch, say. Wittgenstein's suggestion (found, e.g., in *Investigations* §136) comes to this. Suppose there *are* these two kinds of case. Now ask what, assuming that, you would be prepared to count as a case of the first sort, what as a case of the second. On present knowledge, at least, unless physics yet holds surprises, I would count being on a rug as of the first sort. I am fairly confident that you would too. *En route* to his case against private language, Frege suggests a case of the second sort:

Is that linden tree an idea? Inasmuch as I use the expression, 'that linden tree' in posing the question, I already anticipate the answer; for I mean this expression to designate something which I see, and which can also concern and be touched by others. Now there are two possibilities. If my intention is achieved, if I do designate something with the expression, 'that linden tree', then the thought expressed in the sentence, 'That linden is my idea' is obviously to be denied. But if I fail in my intention, if I only think I see, without actually seeing, if, accordingly, the designation of 'that linden' is empty, then, without realising it or wanting to, I have strayed into fiction. Then neither the content of the sentence, 'That linden is my idea', nor that of the sentence, 'That linden is not my idea', is true, for then in both cases I have a predication which lacks an object. (1918: 68)

Either 'That linden' refers to a tree, or 'That linden is my idea' does not express a thought. I am with Frege here. In any case, let us suppose that, when we engage in this exercise, we prove to agree well enough, often enough, on what we *would* call genuine, and what we *would* call spurious, given that there *are* those two types of case. We are not regularly unable to agree; and what we do agree on leads us into no intolerable messes—the world provides us with no compelling reasons to rethink. Then there *is* such a distinction; and it *is* to be drawn (nearly enough) as we are prepared to draw it.

On the one hand, this story re-invokes agreement, in at most only a slightly different form. We agree on what one *would* call *something being on a rug*, given that we are going to call some such things that at all; and we agree on whether *so* treating the nonconceptual (the historical

unfolding of the world) lands us in intolerable messes—forces us to say, or commit to doing, things which are, as Wittgenstein puts it, “uninteresting or stupid, or too complicated, or something of the sort.” On the other, Wittgenstein’s point here is that there is no *other* way for there to be *schein*-thoughts, or *schein*-ways for things to be—so, in particular, for there to be *schein*-agreement than for there to be agreement as to what would count as a case of a *schein*-way for things to be (or etc.)—which, he suggests, as to when it would be too stupid, or etc., to suppose otherwise.

One can think of the core point here in terms of communication. Where I state something, agreement decides what is to be expected of the world if I am right—what is to be expected of the world’s unfolding, that is, of the nonconceptual, on pain of my not having said things to be if they are. Those expectations might be disappointed, or satisfied, by the unfolding world; in which case, at the least, I have not said what is so. If *such* expectations are disappointed systematically, and deeply, enough, then, perhaps, there is no such thing as things being that way which I purported to say they are. It is not just that *Pia* is not a witch (16th century understanding); disappointment of this sort is endemic to calling anyone one. But suppose there is no disappointment. The world unfolds just as we agree one would expect it to if I am right; none other than what *we* agree I thus committed to. Then, the idea is, there is no *other* way for me to be speaking of a mere *schein*-way for things to be; nothing more to being a genuine way for things to be than for the world to satisfy *our* expectations aroused in, and by, so treating it.

I have unfolded these ideas in terms of thinking, rather than meaning. But a story about meaning can now begin here: Where, in given words, I mean to say that such-and-such is so, I mean to express a thought in Frege’s sense, thus to say what a community of thinkers can think, dispute, investigate, etc. Agreement in this community allows my meaning to extend to cases I cannot then get in mind just as per the above story. Not that the only way I can mean words is to say something to be so. There is anyway more to be said about meaning in particular. But I will not say it here.

What, then, is the importance of communities of thinkers, in our present non-geographical, non-ethnic, sense? A community of agreement, with its sense for acknowledgement, makes at least for a distinction between particular cases which are what it would acknowledge as instancing such-and-such, and ones which it would not so acknowledge (or acknowledge as not doing that). But why cannot I, on my own, no thanks to a community, make for a parallel distinction? The idea would be: *N* now has some way for things (or a thing) to be in mind; he cannot now think, of novel particular cases (relative to now), that they instance that way, or that they fail to. But when they come along, in the future, he can find them to do the one thing or the other. Why cannot this evince a (*N*’s) sense for acknowledgement—for what, in general, to count as a case of something (or of things) being that way? And if so, why is there not a distinction, among particular cases, between those which are what *N* would count as a case of something being *A*, and those which are not that?

The quickest way with this idea, I think, is to invoke Frege’s private language argument. Having a sense for what to acknowledge as a case of something being *A*, or being what *N* would acknowledge as a case of that, are, in the first case, a way for someone to be, in the second, a way for things to be, which *we* can get in mind. *Their* participation in the instancing relation is fixed,

or at least identified, by what *we* would agree to. So if what we are talking about is *acknowledgement*, then a particular case is what would count as what *N* would count as a case of *A* only if it is what *we* would agree would count as what *N* would count as a case of *A*. If, given that, there is a distinction between what *N* would so count and what he would not, this is to say that *we* can recognise when a case is what *N* would count as something being *A*, which is to say that *we* can recognise what it is that *N* is counting as something being *A*. If *N* thus identifies a way for things to be, then what *he* would so count identifies what would count as something being *A*. So *we*, too, can get something being *A* in mind. And now we form a community with *N*, to which all above remarks apply.

But suppose that only *N* can apply the notion *what N would count as a case of A*, which is to say, *what, by N's sense for what to acknowledge, would be a case of something being A*. Then what *N* is applying is not the notion *what to acknowledge as a case of such-and-such*, or those other notions just invoked. We have changed the subject, just as you change the subject of whether a thought can be an idea when you stop talking about ideas being *true* and start talking about their being 'true' in some new sense. On this supposition, what a community can be said to do in saying it to acknowledge something, or exercise a sense for this, is not something which *N*, apart from a community, can be said to do at all. Neither this, nor anything in this section, is meant as a private language argument. That came (in outline) in section 1, its result assumed thenceforth and throughout. This last point simply applies what has occurred already.

Our minds cannot change the nonconceptual—what there is for the conceptual to reach to—excepting that part of it which just is their being as they are. This, in essence, is what Frege's side of his coin says. But they can furnish our ways of articulating the nonconceptual. How we carve up the *way* things are into particular ways *for* things to be may depend on the means thus supplied. The way *our* minds work can thus matter to what bits of the conceptual we have, or can get in mind—what there is within our grasp with reach to the nonconceptual. This is Wittgenstein's reverse side of Frege's coin. Minds can do this working jointly, forming a community of thinkers. Following Wittgenstein's unfolding of Frege's core ideas, I have just argued that there is no other way for them to do so.

5. Shadows: That remark in the *Blue Book* from which we started, about someone's meaning not admitting of interpretation, occurs in a longer discussion of what Wittgenstein there calls shadows. This discussion, particularly as it concerns intention, asks to be read as a commentary on Frege. It is critical of an idea one *might* find in Frege if one read him in a certain way. Again it concerns a misunderstanding of an idea of not admitting of interpretation, this time as applied to thoughts.

Misunderstanding how certain expressions work, the *Blue Book* tells us, can create a seeming puzzle—to which shadows may seem to offer a solution:

“How can one think what is not the case? If I think that King's College is on fire when it is not on fire, the fact of its being on fire does not exist. Then

how can I think it?

The next step we are inclined to take is to think that as the object of our thought isn't the fact it is a shadow of the fact. There are different names for this shadow, e.g., "proposition", "sense of the sentence".

But this doesn't remove our difficulty. For the question now is: "How can something be the shadow of a fact which doesn't exist?" ... "How can we know what the shadow is a shadow of?" (32)

In present terms, if King's College is not (now) burning, then nothing in the actual unfolding of the world instances that bit of the conceptual, King's College (now) burning—what a thought that King's College is now burning would be of. So there is nothing of which one could think, '*This* is things being as thus thought.' There is simply *no* thought to such effect. So there is no *such* way of identifying how things would be if they *were* as thus thought. So we posit some other way of identifying this. Wittgenstein calls it a shadow. When I think that King's College is burning, this other thing, the shadow, is the 'object of my thought'. If King's College *is* burning, then King's College's being as it is will exactly match the shadow—in present terms, instance it. If King's College is *not* burning, then King's College's being as it is will exactly fail to match. The shadow provides for both possibilities. Now, on the one hand, if it did not, it would not be the object of the thought that King's College is on fire. But, on the other, if there is such a shadow, and if, say, King's College is not on fire, then there is *nothing* (in the unfolding of the world) of which to think truly that *this* matches it. So how can there be such a thing as the envisioned matching at all?

In our present terms, the problem is how a thought can have the sort of reach that a thought would have to have in order to be the thought that King's College is on fire. What could make it reach? So far, at least, the idea of a shadow does not seem to help. Wittgenstein suggests, though, that we can see how a thought can have such reach—we can solve, or dissolve, our puzzle—if we can see how a portrait can be a portrait of so-and-so:

I can restate our problem by asking: "What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?" (31)

I remark that this is not obviously correct. Standardly, at least, one needs to sit for a portrait. (There is deferred sitting, as in sending a photo.) So there can only be portraits of people there *are*. They require the artist's acquaintance with the person (again, perhaps deferred). Acquaintance matters to what thoughts the artist can think. Perhaps Wittgenstein himself is making a mistake here. For his first response to the question how one can think what is not the case is:

How can we hang a thief who doesn't exist?" Our answer could be ... : "I can't hang him when he doesn't exist; but I can look for him when he doesn't exist." (31)

But surely one cannot look for a thief who doesn't exist. (In the *Investigations* (§462), this is changed to: "I can look for someone when he isn't there, but not hang him when he isn't there"; which is correct.) The best one could do is think he is looking for someone when he is not. To devote my life to 'looking for the thief of Baghdad' is just to suffer an illusion. (See my (forthcoming) for elaboration on why it is a philosophical illusion to think otherwise.)

Bracketing this point, though, let us see how Wittgenstein thinks the question about portraits can be answered. We can then work out how this answer is meant to apply to the problem shadows were meant to (but cannot) solve. About portraits, he says this:

An obvious, and correct, answer to the question "What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?" is that it is the *intention*. But if we wish to know what it means "intending this to be a portrait of so-and-so" let's see what actually happens when we intend this. (32)

This reference to portraits and intentions also reads as reference to Frege's introduction, in "Der Gedanke", of the notion of a thought, on which the discussion of shadows thus becomes commentary.

Frege compares thoughts and pictures as follows:

So is a picture, as mere visible, tangible thing really true? And a stone, or leaf, not true? Clearly one would not call a picture true, if an intention did not attach to it. (1918: 59)

Think of a picture as painted canvas. Now what, if anything, does it depict? Frege's point is that there is no answer to that question unless there is an answer to the question how it is to be taken (to be depicting)—e.g., what manner, or style, of depiction it is to be taken to be engaging in. Frege refers to an intention attaching to the picture as what (if anything) answers this. Perhaps that is not quite right. But it will do for present purposes. It may be, given such an answer, that the picture depicts Cologne Cathedral. It may then be further to be taken to depict it as looking a certain way, and then, further, perhaps, as looking the way it looks. All that may leave further questions to be answered. Does that patch on the canvas depict early morning shadow or a graffito? Is the church really fuzzy around the edges, or is that meant as morning mist? Are those flying buttresses intentionally distorted for some effect, or to capture a particular perspective? Is

the picture meant to depict the Cathedral as it will look after renovation, or as the artist remembers it from childhood, or as it did look on a particular morning, or simply as it looks—in which last case, what would count as looking as it looks? And so on. If the picture is to be taken to represent the cathedral as it looks, then we *might*, intelligibly, view it as truth-evaluable. But only if there are answers to enough such questions as to in which way it is to be taken; enough for us to see, of the cathedral's being as it is that this *is* its being as depicted, or that it is not.

This states half of Frege's point. The other half is that there is always *substantive* work for intention to do. A painted canvas, no matter how painted, *could* represent in any of many ways, or in none, depending on how it is to be taken (on what intention attaches to it). Painted canvases always admit of representing in any of many ways; always admit, so far as they go, of any of many intentions attaching to them.

Frege's first point, then, is that a question of truth arises—something so or not has been represented as so—only where an intention, or what does that work, has settled enough such issues. He then goes on to argue:

Accordingly, the sense of a sentence emerges as the only thing with which being true can come into question at all. (1918: 60)

Without meaning by this to give a definition, I call something a thought by which truth can come into question at all. (1918: 60)

So intentions, in providing answers to enough questions of interpretation, can make a definite question of truth arise—can bring truth into question. They can do this, notably, for words to which they attach. For them to do this is for them to make an identifiable something attach to those words: a given sense of a particular sort (the sort that goes with saying something so or not). Such a sense answers all the questions of interpretation which need answers in order to see when what was thus said would be true, when false. It fixes a reach for what was said. It itself is not open to interpretation. That is, it cannot be that whether it answers those questions in one way or another depends on whether one thing or another attaches to it—or, for that matter, on anything. It is, in this respect, like a canvas so painted that it admitted only one intention to attach—so called for none. We already know, from Frege's initial point, that no painted canvas could do this. Which explains (from one perspective) why Frege insists that thoughts must be invisible and intangible.

So far, Frege has said nothing one, or Wittgenstein, need disagree with, if it is read right. What would that reading be? Wittgenstein's commentary on this picture of what an intention might do for words begins with this remark:

We imagine the shadow to be a picture the intention of which *cannot be questioned*, that is, a picture which we don't interpret in order to understand

it, but which we understand without interpreting it. (36)

And it ends with this one:

If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture ... (37)

How might these connect?

Here is one way of conceiving a picture the intention of which cannot be questioned: it would be a canvas so painted that only one intention could attach to it, which is to say that no intention is needed for it to represent in that one and only way in which something so painted could. One simply *could* not make such a canvas represent in either of two different ways by attaching either of two different intentions to it. This idea is, as Frege saw, incoherent. But Wittgenstein's shadows, like Frege's thoughts, are meant to be invisible and intangible (not objects of sensory awareness). In that respect, they are not like a canvas. And they are meant to be things which need no intention attaching to them in order to occupy a given place within the conceptual, hence in order to reach to the nonconceptual just as, and where, they do. (For Frege, relations between what he calls concepts *reduce* to that of objects *falling under* concepts (1892-1895: 128). By parallel, we could see relations within the conceptual as reducing to the instancing relation (to relations between reaches), if all we meant by that is that if you fix this last thing, you fix the first.) Which entails that no intention (nor anything else) attaching to them could make them reach in one way rather than another. So they admit of no interpretation in the sense that they could not *correctly* be understood in either of two ways depending on further factors in some occasion for identifying, or understanding, them. Which also suggests that all this may be just a piece of grammar.

We might conceive a picture on the model of a painted canvas; something which is what it is anyway, independent of any intention that might attach to it. It takes up space, or is mostly yellow, say, regardless of how you understand it, or what intention attaches to it. Nor could any *intention*, or understanding, attaching to it change all that. With respect to such features of it—those which make it the canvas that it is—it is like Fregean thoughts. On the other hand, such a canvas needs something else to be so of it—if we follow Frege, then some intention attaching to it—before it can represent, or depict, at all; but not before some central square in it can be yellow. We might also conceive a picture on the model of a portrait—say, a portrait of Goethe's mother, or a picture of her sitting, or a depiction of quiet desperation. It would not be *that* portrait unless it portrayed Goethe's mother. It admits of no interpretation: you could not *correctly* understand it to do other than portray Goethe's mother, no matter in what circumstances you did this, no matter what *else* was so of the portrait. So the portrait needs no intention attaching to *it* in order to portray Goethe's mother: it needs no *further* intention attaching to it; an intention already

attaches to the canvas, which makes that canvas, and thus this portrait, a portrait of Goethe's mother. Nor could any further intention attaching to *it* make it portray otherwise than it already does. Perhaps I can see a portrait of Goethe's mother as a picture of quiet desperation, while you, with equal right, see it as a picture of self-satisfaction. But if so, *it* neither represents her in the one way or the other. In these respects it, too, is like a Fregean thought, and like a shadow.

Thoughts are neither canvases nor portraits. They are not things to which an intention might attach, thus making them represent in one way or another. They already represent in the only way they could. But nor is there something else which, canvas-like, by dint of an intention attaching to it, might be a thought. So they are not like portraits either. No intention, and nothing like one, no matter where attached, makes *them* represent as they do. A *thought* brooks no interpretation. It *answers* questions as to the reach of representations; it does not pose them. All of which is just the grammar which fits a certain notion—that notion which Frege labels 'a thought'. Thoughts just *are* what answer, but do not pose, a certain sort of question. It is inept to seek explanations for how they are *able* to do such a thing, as if there were something else which *could* be enabled to do this. If you have not identified what fits the grammar which goes with *thought*—what reaches without, and admits of no, interpretation—then what you have identified (if anything) is just *not* a thought. (Of course, it would be equally inept to think of a thought as a kind of cognitive prosthetic which, once we somehow installed it in our thinking, allowed this to reach where it could not reach already. To repeat the main moral of this essay, there would be no way for such installation to be achieved.)

Something fitting the grammar of *thought* is required, as Frege saw, by the environmental nature of our postures towards the world: insofar as they articulate into (truth-evaluable) postures towards particular ways *for* it to be or not, they must be postures for *ranges* of thinkers to adopt (or reject); hence ones whose reach rests on a background of agreement, in the way sketched above. So if Pia said, 'The meat is on the rug', and thereby said something to be so—something towards which one may hold a posture of thinking it to be the way things are (or are not)—then we can say such things as, 'What Pia said is true', and 'Sid thinks so too'; in doing which we identify something which fits the grammar of a thought—something with a definite, non-negotiable, *just* that reach thought would have in assuming just that posture. We thus identify some *one* thing over which to agree or disagree. Or we can also do all this in saying, say, 'Many think that the meat is on the rug', or, 'It is true that the meat is on the rug', and so on.

One has not identified a thought unless one has identified what fits the grammar just set out—what reaches just *so*, independent of interpretation, or of any form of agreement as to its reach. Which *might* make one wonder how we ever manage to do all that. But if we drop the idea of a thought as a cognitive prosthetic, there is nothing extraordinary about this. This is the point of Wittgenstein's concluding remark that, insofar as a thought is a shadow of a fact, words themselves may be such a shadow—perhaps not the English sentence, 'There is meat on the rug' (or 'Fauns gambol'); but words for which agreement does the work of deciding when they would be true, when false. Where Sid said, 'The meat is on the rug', there is (if he said anything at all) a notion *things being as Sid said*, where the reach of that notion is the reach of Sid's words. And there is a range of thinkers who can get that notion in mind. These form a community of agreement as to just where (to what particular cases) that notion would reach. By Wittgenstein's

reverse side of Frege's coin, this identifies where that notion reaches, which is to identify where Sid's words reach. By the same token, this is to identify a thought; one which reaches just *so*, and thus which fits that seemingly demanding grammar for the notion *thought*. In just the same way, if I purport to speak of a thought, in saying, say, 'Many think that there is meat on the rug,' or 'If it is true that there is meat on the rug, then we need a carpet cleaner,' and if I speak intelligibly (as I may or may not do), there is again a range of thinkers who, in the same way, identifies the reach of the notion I express in my words 'that there is meat on the rug'—again thereby identifying something which fits the grammar that goes with the notion *thought*. If a thought is not a cognitive prosthetic, there is no more to identifying one than there is to identifying the reach of given words.

An asymmetry. From *someone's* words—as from someone's posture towards the world—we can abstract things shareable: things *defined* by their reach, so brooking no interpretation; things on which different thinkers may agree or disagree. Suppose we locate some such thing in the words of different speakers. Do we thereby settle when the words of each would be true? Perhaps not. A thought—something to commit to—admits of no interpretation. A way for things to be—something for a thought to be of—does so admit. Meat being on the rug is a way for things to be. Different understandings of things so being are possible. Is calf's brains on the rug, or ribeye separated from the rug by butcher paper, things being that way or not? In each case there is an understanding of things so being on which it is, and an understanding on which it is not. Calf's brains (offal in general) sometimes would, sometimes would not, count as meat. Sid and Pia may agree as to there being meat on the rug. Each may have said things to be that way. We may see such agreement in what each said as agreement on a thought which each expressed; to which each thus committed. The ribeye, perhaps, makes both right. But might one have been right, the other wrong, had there been calf's brain on the rug (and might it depend on in just what form this happened)? Nothing in the grammar that fits *thought* rules this possibility out. Such is the point of Wittgenstein's commentary on Frege in *Investigations* §22. But it is a point to be developed elsewhere.

Wittgenstein, thinking through Frege's most central ideas, leads us to such points. Frege emerges, not as target, but as inspiration.¹

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